

DRAFT OF URGENT MEASURES TO BE TAKEN  
TOWARD FRENCH INDO-CHINA

(Very Secret)

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Racial Problem Committee,  
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(Regarding this draft, although there has already been some changes in the situation, we still offer this for the reader's inspection.)

Draft of Urgent Measures to be Taken toward French Indo-China.

I. Basis for taking urgent measures.

1. The various peoples of Indo-China such as the Annamese who had maintained their independence and ruled over the Indo-China Peninsula for a thousand years, the Cambodians who once had a great civilization, the Laosians etc., were invaded by France about eighty years ago, and successively conquered with military force. Today, they have become a protectorate of France and moreover, Cochin China has been ceded from Annam to French territory. Nevertheless, whether the name be protectorate or territory, it is in reality the same as far as their internal and external affairs of state being administered by the French people is concerned.

2. France has made these people and their countries the target of her exploitation. She has oppressed the native people and prevented their development, and has locked out foreign countries and monopolized the rich resources of these countries. Yet, due to the lack of people and the fever for enterprises, and also from natural inconveniences such as being geographically in a remote position, France has left the greater part still a backward region.

3. Thus, these peoples who have lost their former vigour, forgotten culture and were robbed of their resources, mean under the unfortunate circumstances of being reduced to a state of primitive uncivilized people, and fierce animals and venomous serpents are rampant over the greater part of their country.

The French declaration asserting that by leading

and enlightening the younger generation she is blessing them with European culture, is but a meaningless propaganda. This can easily be seen when one witnesses the actual conditions of the natives and furthermore, when the conditions of this area are compared with that of Thailand, Korea, and Formosa, everyone can clearly recognize this.

4. Even from the viewpoint of merely maintaining an existence by stabilizing the livelihood of the nation and securing resources for national defense, our country depends largely upon the resources of these regions. Furthermore, if considered from the positive viewpoint of developing national strength, the development and utilization of these resources are of vital importance for us. On the other hand, the native peoples urgently require our industrial products as seen from their culture, manners and customs, and style of living. Furthermore, with Japan being adjacent geographically and being a highly industrialized country, the resources of these regions can most naturally and effectively be developed and led on the road to prosperity. In short, there are conditions of mutual aid, of co-existence and co-prosperity possessed by both these regions and Japan.

5. Our country, therefore, has endeavored to peacefully realize trade and economic coalition with these regions, for the past forty years, but France has not responded thinking that economic coalition with our country would lead to political debauchment. As the result, our country and other Asiatic countries have been levied unfavorable heavy duties compared to European countries, in commercial treatment. Regarding our treatment after the entrance into the country, we receive unfavorable treatment as the European people in not having rights to own land and not being granted fishing rights as the Chinese. The conclusion is that our country in trying to be treated as the most favored nation is, in reality, being treated as the most maltreated nation.

Furthermore, France not only abused our people and products in French Indo-China, but have considered the development of Japan in East Asia to be a menace to France just as the development of Germany in Europe, and have always taken a policy to obstruct Japan's development. While committing such maltreatment against us in French Indo-China during peace time, they have taken advantage of the indifferent attitude of the Japanese people and have utilized us for their European policy. They profess



to be friendly with us in order to check Germany but once our country encounters a crisis, she has always sided with the parties opposed to us and has always taken positive antagonistic actions toward us. Aside from the intervention in our internal affairs by which France obstructed the great Restoration by aiding the Shogunate and rebels, the Triple Intervention in the Sino-Japanese war, assistance to Russia in the Russo-Japanese war (especially the granting of permission to use the Kamuren Bay /T.N. phonetic/ as a base for the Baltic Fleet) anti-Japanese movement leading the League of Nations in the Manchurian Incident, and the movement assisting Chiang Kai-shek in the China Incident prove this. There has never existed such a country among great powers in the world that steadfastly maintained an anti-Japanese attitude, in time of our national crisis. Moreover, the greatest cause to make her take this policy lies in safeguarding her possession of French Indo-China. If that be the case, we cannot but draw a conclusion that the French possession of French Indo-China is, indeed, one of the root of our evils.

6. In short, the French policy which has hitherto been adopted in relation to French Indo-China hinders the prosperity of the natives and the development of the land. It aims for the monopoly of French interests at the sacrifice of the co-existence and co-prosperity relations between Japan and French India.

7. But even such an irrational and unfair policy would be justified as an act of autonomy rights towards foreign countries and an exercise of protective and administrative rights when applied to the domestic affairs of Indo-China; and when the Annamese, from unsuppressable agencies, resorted from time to time to desperate independence movements, they brand it as an insurgent's uprisings, and any adverse criticisms by foreigners were branded as undue interference or aggressive intentions; and, moreover, they never reflected whatsoever on their own present and past which was an aggression of violence and unfairness and acts of exploitation.

8. Accordingly, we came to the decision that it was impossible for our country to realize the co-existence and co-prosperity of the various people in East Asia and also the prosperity of the Indo-China races by resorting to peaceful measures, and therefore deem that the only way to establish a new order that is capable of bringing about the true co-existence and co-prosperity with other races here with our country is to drive away the French

influence from these areas even if it requires military force. In order to do this, we need to prepare ourselves and rise with the first opportunity available.

This must be the fundamental policy of our country towards French India.

9. Now it is the high time for us to carry out the said policy because France itself is now in face with a crisis and is in such a situation that she cannot look after her colonies. In addition, she has utilized French Indo-China as a route to assist Chiang Kai-shek in our current China Incident, thereby expressing to us openly her enemy feelings. It is, however, quite an easy matter at present for us to make France discontinue her reinforcement to Chiang Kai-shek, and if we only threaten her with a firm attitude, she will discontinue it at once. As for carrying out her promises, it could be easily conceived that she will consent to us stationing our watchmen at Paiphong and other necessary places. But, today, our country should not be satisfied with such a near-sighted settlement of problems. In reality we must avail ourselves on the reinforcement rendered to Chiang Kai-shek as the reason of our exercising of military forces, and thereby make it an aim of ours to emancipate the people of Indo-China, which is our profound objective and also in the establishment of a part of the new order in East Asia.

## II. The ulterior motive of the urgent measures and its final objective.

1. Our country is devoted to the settlement of the China Incident. But, French Indo-China is one of the important reinforcement routes to Chiang Kai-shek and has clearly expressed animosity towards our country. We should, therefore, make it the ulterior reason that we have been forced to use arms in order to have this discontinued.

The reason why we emphasize the said reason is to suggest to the world at this opportunity that we do not possess the intention of attacking successively the other Oriental colonies of Britain, France, and Netherlands, which are not harmful to us. The absence of the said intention should, however, be left to the bystanders' conjecture and we should refrain from making any positive statement on this. That is, to avoid being availed as a pledge, when afterwards we execute our plans to Hongkong, leased territories and concessions in China, Dutch Indies and Malay Peninsula.

2. Our profound objective lies in the emancipation of the various people of French Indo-China namely, the Annamese



by taking advantage of this opportunity (the question of whether Cambodia and Laos are to be territories of Annam or not, should be given consideration afterwards) and to have them join the Cooperative Body of East Asia planned by us.

Such being our aim, the exercise of our military forces will be absolutely necessary to be extended not only to such points as Haiphong and Fanchi which are directly connected to the reinforcement routes to Chiang Kai-shek but also to all necessary points that can drive away the French influence. And, in regard to the independence movements of the natives, let it appear to be a spontaneous action caused through their own volition in the beginning, and we must take the attitude that although we have profound sympathy for them, we do not interfere. And, once they have accomplished shaping their independence, we must support them positively because it would be in concurrence to the racial intention and co-existence and co-prosperity of East Asia, and we must assume a firm attitude to permit no interference from any other country. Such a measure as was taken recently by the Empire towards Germany and Italy requesting them to take into their consideration the fact that our Empire has deep concerns for French Indo-China and therefore to refrain from bringing about any unfriendly changes on the status quo of French Indo-China, admits spontaneously that French Indo-China is already in their hands. This opens the door for their interference of our future treatment of French Indo-China and also admits their interference on the new establishment of East Asia, which brings about a great disadvantage to us. Against this measure we can anticipate the following antagonisms:

1. There will be an opinion from the moral point of view that we should not resort to fire - thief or piller activities in another nation's crisis, since it is immoral and will injure the international reputation and will be inconsistent with the far-fetched policies of our nation. However, France has always pointed out that she has never fought against Japan and while expressing friendship on the surface, she is the most notorious country in the world which never fails to take hostile actions toward our country in time when Japan is in imminent danger. This fact has been mentioned before so France is in no position to comment on morality. However, we have no intention to retaliate force with force but as mentioned before, our aim is not only to

realize international justice but who is not ashamed to be ashamed of in attempting to stop their continuing hostile actions against us today?

A man asked Confucious, "What do you mean by 'return good for evil'?" Confucious replied, "What do you return for good? You should be straightforward in returning evil and return good for good."

(Analects of Confucious.)

2. Some men will express their view that we should concentrate all our efforts to settle the China Incident because meddling into the affairs of French Indo-China will only complicate the situation. It will result in, as an old saying goes, "He who chases after two hares will catch neither." However, the elimination of French influence from French Indo-China will not only intercept the effective aid-Chiang route and contribute to the settlement of the China Incident but will bring pressure to bear on Yunnan and Burma and will enable us to take proper measures in these areas if necessary. Furthermore, it is believed that this step can be easily accomplished by propagating the natives, which will be explained later, and consequently, our damage in carrying out this step will be slight. In addition to the above advantages, when French Indo-China is liberated, economically, we can readily get from that area such necessary materials as rice, coal, iron ore, manganese, tin ore, silicon sand, salt, lacquer, timber, cotton, rubber, etc., and gradually we can also exploit and utilize the abundant resources there.

3. There may be a conjecture that though Britain may not meddle with our actions, America may interfere with force or at least, by the means of prohibiting exports to this country.

Unlike Dutch East Indies, America has no practical interests, namely, no vested rights, in French Indo-China and the trade with her is insignificant. But America is quite likely to put pressure upon us because from the general political point of view, they cannot tolerate spiritually the fact that a democratic country is about to lose a part of her colony in the East. But, if we emphasize that our step against French Indo-China is indispensable to stop hostile actions against us by cutting off the supply routes for Chiang's army, and that if we can assure America that we have no intention to attack the English, French and Dutch colonies, America will not resort to armed intervention at once. On



the other hand, if we show an indication that if America forbids the exportation of her goods to Japan prior to the said step, we shall be compelled to occupy Dutch East Indies to secure resources of vital importance for the successful execution of the China Incident and for the general national defense. America will be unable to resort to prohibiting exports to Japan because it will be the cause to make the present hostilities in the East more extensive.

4. France will become a second-rate power. Regardless of the past activities, there will be an opinion that France hereafter will take a concessive attitude toward our advance in that area and that everything will be settled successfully in peace without appealing to arms.

Men who are in favor of maintenance of the status quo are deeply imbued with this opinion, but they are wrong in their anticipation. In the first place, assuming that France can continue holding possession of French Indo-China, although it is doubtful judging from the present circumstances, France will lose much territory and colonies in this war so that she will become more dependent on French Indo-China than in the past which will be reasons for her strengthening the defense of French Indo-China. From France's point of view, the country to menace French Indo-China will be Japan. Therefore, she will be more cautious of us and furthermore, since she has not enough power to defend herself against us singlehanded, it is most likely that she will attempt to induce America and Britain (especially America) against us. She had maintained a somewhat exclusive policy even toward Britain and America heretofore regarding French Indo-China, since she was confident that she was able to defend French Indo-China with her international prestige and diplomacy. But, hereafter she will willingly induce America's investment in the colony and will establish close economic relation with America by offering her special rights. Furthermore, it is quite certain that she will strengthen her national defense with the aid of Britain and America by completing a naval port, the second Singapore in Kamran (transliteration) Bay for instance, for the joint use of the above nations.

In this way, France would let Britain and U. S. emerge as far as French Indo-China, and Japan would be put in a more unfavourable situation compared with the past, when considering the relation not only be-

tween French Indo-China, but also between China. Moreover, our country seems to have acted herself a part of a watch-dog for France by demanding Germany and Italy not to stress any unfriendly changes on French Indo-China. Germany and Italy, belligerent at present, may admit this demand of ours; but if the war should end in their victory, it would be hard to tell what attitude they would take. They may not go so far as to change the ownership in particular, but they would probably bring about some conditions favorable to them, with regard at least to rights and interests as well as other treatments, and they would advance a great deal into these areas with their remaining power, and thus increase the number of our rivals, thereby making it still more difficult for us to establish the cooperative body of East Asia. Although the future decline of France will be effective in increasing our power in French Indo-China, and since other great nations could also similarly bear power, we must bear in mind, therefore, that it would be just a dream to expect that our country alone could advance favorably.

Besides, even if Germany and Italy should agree to our offer, it is probable that all the tribes, in French Indo-China, especially the Annamese, would ask Germany to assist them in their independence, saying that the lukewarm attitude of Japan is not trustworthy. If Germany, in compliance with this request, should try to establish the independence of the tribes in French Indo-China at the peace treaty on the plea of releasing the oppressed tribes of the East Asia, what attitude should we take? If we should object their independence accounting it for prematurity or for any other reason whatever, Japan's spiritual influence over the tribes of the East Asia and their confidence in Japan would entirely fall to the ground; and, if we should agree to it, (even if we add to the agreement some favorable conditions, economical, etc.) the German influence, as a father of their independence, would decidedly surpass that of ours, and these areas would come practically under the control of Germany.

The above has been stated in response to the supposed objections against the aforesaid step to be taken. Furthermore, considering the following situation, we have to admit that the necessity of taking the decisive step is all the more urgent.



At the Washington Conference, our country fell into a sad plight being forced to give up our rights and interests in Shantung established by the Versailles Peace Treaty due to joint compulsion by America and Britain (these were the rights and interests which had been recognized by Britain and France by a secret treaty since the time of war). Considering the previous example, who could affirm that the United States, who is now enforcing a sensational expansion of armaments in all fields will, after its completion, not offer independently, or in alliance with European countries, such demands as to turn over the situation brought by our execution of the Chinese Policy which she is now disturbing? In such case, what attitude would they take--those who already fear that Japan would not be able to continue the war because of the embargo of petroleum and scrap iron? If we are to obtain these materials from elsewhere and cope with America, we should at first, secure the place. And we cannot obtain them from America or Europe. By all means we must obtain them from the nearby East or from the South. Nevertheless, as long as we act with the objective of only recognizing the status quo of the controlling rights of these European countries over these areas, those controlling countries would at this crisis not only stop their supply of materials to us, but would also positively take hostile actions against us in spite of our good will.

If such is the case, the fruits of the China Incidents to which our country is now devoting at present, will eventually have to be given up ten years hence. Therefore, while Europe and America are entirely occupied with the battles in Europe, it is necessary for us to prepare our power to defend our ground firmly that could sufficiently cope with the movement of America in the future after she accomplishes the expansion of her armaments. For that purpose, we must carry out resolutely the emancipation of East Asia, and thereby establish such a situation as that which can cooperate with us, and also to secure the resources and strategic position into our hands or to that of our friends.

### III. Method of executing emergent measures.

1. After Japan announces the aforementioned reasons given in Item 1 of Article 2, Faiphong, Tourane and Saigon (Saigon may be omitted at first if there is danger of irritating U.S.) will be blockaded and at the same time, troops will be landed in Kuangtung, Kuanghsi or some other convenient coast to attack and capture Faiphong and Panoi, and also to commence military operations at various points of importance.

2. Furriedly summon Annamese patriots who have planned for Annamese independence and who have previously found refuge in Japan, China and Siam. Have these patriots enter French Indo-China together with the armed forces and have them form something like an Annamese Temporary Independent Government and also propagate on a grand scale to oust the French influence and to cooperate for the accomplishment of independence.

3. It is out of the question to expect them to fully display the functions of a new government because of the lack of time but the Annamese national system is sound and based on their advanced "Sha" (township and villages) system of self-government. Therefore, although the functions of the central and local governments may cease temporarily, there may not be much confusion. The local authorities will prosecute their duties as usual if ordered to do so by the central government, although they may not act to oust the French influence until orders arrive from the central government. Of course, it will be necessary for Japan to form a military government for the time being to maintain peace and order and to form a suitable administration.

4. It goes without saying that when our troops advance into French Indo-China, we must propagate that our aim is to check the aid-Chiang activities by the French and not to capture the territory of French Indo-China. Especially, the method to be used by the Annamese Temporary Independent Government to propagate the demand for Annamese to join the movement for independence, should be by sending Annamese propagating agents into the territory controlled by the French. Also, by radio, pamphlets dropped from planes, and by other means, Annamese troops, workers in communication and transportation organizations, as railways, trains, ships, telegraph, telephones, bodies of laborers in factories and plantations, officials in schools, unions, newspapers, should be the object from whom cooperation for an independent movement be appealed. According to the position and circumstances of each individual, he will occupy, destroy or sabotage the aforementioned organs and thus destroy the functions of the French troops and authorities. After this is accomplished, propaganda shall be gradually spread among the Annamese in general. Since Japan shall advocate that the direct object is to intercept the aid-Chiang route, she must at first take an indifferent attitude toward the independence movement. But gradually, the movement shall be supported by asserting that if the long cherished independence is accomplished, it will greatly contribute to the mutual existence and prosperity of East Asia.



There may be a number of French troops and troops of the Foreign Legion; there may be a number of planes, tanks and warships but they are of no consequence. Annamese troops and the majority of the people will immediately join the independence movement or at least, will take a neutral attitude. There may be some that may be forced by the French to resist. But since the French homeland has surrendered to the Germans, it is believed that the French troops today have no real intention to fight. They may make a weak display of resistance but will gradually follow the example of their homeland and proclaim "free" zones. In this manner, the emancipation of the French Indo-China inhabitants will be easily accomplished. This does not mean that we can be over-confident. As when the lion strikes a rabbit, we must be prepared to exert every effort to accomplish our objective.

5. As mentioned above, efforts will be made to realize the Annamese emancipation on the one hand, and we must begin to establish the new order on the other hand, to lead and support them. In order to accomplish these aims aside from military activities we must endeavor and be fully prepared in political, economical, cultural and the other matters. However, this is a secondary problem. The Japanese Government and the public must make a firm determination to carry out the primary problems. Since this is considered to be the most urgent problem, the secondary problem will not be discussed here.

June 19, 1940.

# EXHIBIT NO. —

昭和十五年六月二十六日

民族問題委員會

國策研究會事務局

秘 密

2379--1

「佛領印度支那ニ對スル緊急處置案」

委員 永田 実 言 語 提 出

(本案ニ就テハ既ニ一部事實ノ變化)  
セルモノアルモ不取敢覽ニ供ス

佛領印度支那ニ對スル緊急處置案

## 第一、緊急處置ヲ行フ根據

一 一千年來獨立ヲ保持シテ印度支那半島ノ王者デア  
ツタ安南人、曾テハ大文化ヲ有シタ東瀛人、ソ  
ノ他老嫗人等ノ印度支那諸民族ハ約八十年前カラ  
佛國ノ侵略ニ會ヒ、相繼イデ武力ニ依ツテ征服セ  
ラレ、現在ハソノ被保護國トナツテ居リ、内、交  
駐支那ハ安南ヨリ割讓シテ佛國ノ領土トナツテオ  
ル。シカシ保護領ト謂ヒ、領土トイフモ、事實上  
ハ何レモ内外ノ政治ハ佛人ニ依ツテ行ハレテ居ル  
コトハ一樣デアル。



ニ佛國ハ此等民族及其ノ國土ヲ擄取ノ目的トシ、土  
着民族ヲ制壓シテ其ノ發展ヲ阻害シ、資源ニ富ム  
國土ヲ獨占シテ外國ニ閉鎖シ、シカモ自ラハ人口  
及ビ企業心ノ缺乏ト地理的遠隔等ニヨル自然的條  
件ノ不便トニヨリ其ノ大部分ヲ未開發ノマ、ニ抛  
擲シテキル。

ニ此クテ此等諸民族ハ昔ノ氣力ヲ失ヒ、文化ヲ忘レ、  
資力ヲ奪ハレテ原始的未開人ノ狀態ニ還元セル不  
幸ノ境遇ニ呻吟シ、國土ノ大部分ハ、徒ニ猛獸、  
毒蛇ノ跳梁ニ委セラレテキル。

佛國ガ世ニ公言シテ後進民族ヲ指導啓發シテ歐洲  
文化ニ浴セシメテキルト稱スルガ如キハ一片ノ空  
宣傳ニ過ギナイ。此レハ一度現地ノ土着人ノ實情  
ヲ視タ者ノ直チニ看破シ得ル所デアリ、更ニ此等  
地方ノ狀態ヲ泰、朝鮮、臺灣ト比較セバ何人モ明  
ラカニ認ムル所デアル。

四我國ハ國民生活ノ安定ト、國防資源ノ確保トイフ  
單ナル生存保持ノ見地ヨリシテモ、既ニ此等地方  
ノ資源ニ俟ツ所大ナルノミナラズ、ソノ國力ノ發  
展トイフ積極的見地ヨリセバ、此等資源ノ開發利  
用ニ求ムル所頗ル大ナルモノガアル。他面土着民  
族ハソノ文化・風俗・生活樣式ヨリ考ヘテモ、我  
國ノ工業製品ヲ求ムルコト大ナルノミナラズ、地

理的ニ近接シ、シカモ高度ノ工業ヲ有スル我國ニ依リ、最モ自然ニシカモ有様ニ該地方ノ資源ヲ開發セラレテ繁榮ノ道ニ赴クコトが出來ルノデアアル。約言スレバ、彼我ノ間ニ相互依存、共存共榮ノ條件が具備シテオアルノデアアル。

武 ヨツテ我國ハ過去四十年ニ亘ツテ此等地方トノ貿易及經濟的提携ヲ平和的ニ實現セム爲ニ努力シタガ、佛國ハ我國トノ經濟的提携ハ我ノ政治的進出ノ前驅ヲ成スモノトシテ之ニ應ゼズ、ソノ結果我國ハ、貿易上ノ待遇ニ於テハ他ノ亞細亞諸國ト同様歐米諸國ニ比シテ非常ニ不利ナル重税ヲ課セラレ、マタ入國後ノ待遇ニ於テハ土地所有權、漁業權等ヲ有スル支那人ニ比シテ歐米人ト同様ニ不利ナル待遇ヲ受ケテ居ル。結局我國ハ最惠國待遇ヲ求メテ、實ハ最惠國待遇ヲ受クルノ狀態ニ甘ンジテオアルノデアアル。

更ニ佛國ハ、印度支那ニ於テ我國人及製品ヲ虐待シ來ツタノミナラズ、我國ノ東亞ニ於ケル發展ハ歐洲ニ於ケル獨逸ノ發展ト同様佛國ヲ脅威スルモノトシテ終始之ヲ妨害スルノ方策ヲ實行シタ。

即チ平時ニ於テハ印度支那ニ於テ右ノ如キ虐待ヲ敢テシナガラモ我國人ノ大部分ガ之ニ無關心ナルヲ利用シテ却ツテ我ヲ自己ノ歐洲政策ニ利用シテ、



獨逸ヲ牽制シムタメ親善ヲ標榜シナガラ、一國我  
國が重大ノ事變ニ遭遇スルト、常ニ我國ト抗爭ス  
ル勢力ニ加擔シテ積極的ニ我ニ對シテ敵性ヲ發揮  
シタノデアアル。幕府又ハ賊軍ヲ援ケテ維新大業ニ  
防害ヲ加ヘタルハ我國内問題ニ對スル干涉トシテ  
コ、ニ加ヘズトスルモ、日清戰爭ニ於ケル三國干  
渉、日露戰爭ニ於ケル露國援助（特ニ印度支那ノ  
「カムラン」灣ヲ「バルチック」艦隊ノ基地ニ使  
用セシメタルガ如キ）滿洲事變ニ於ケル聯盟ヲ指  
導シテノ抗日行動、今次支那事變ニ於ケル援蔣行  
動ガ即デコレデアアル。世界ノ大國中、我が國ノ重  
大時期ニ當ツテ此ノ如ク終始一貫、反日態度ヲ持  
シタ國ハ未ダナイノデアアル。而カモ彼ヲシテ此ノ  
政策ヲ採ラシメル最大ノ原因ハ彼ガ佛印領有ノ安  
全ヲ計ラムトスルコトニアアル。果シテ然ラバ佛國  
ノ佛印領有コソ我國禍根ノ一ナリト斷定セザルヲ  
得ナイノデアアル。

之ヲ要スルニ、佛國ガコレ迄佛印ニ關シテ行ツタ  
政策ハ土着人ノ繁榮ト其ノ國土ノ開發ヲ阻害シ、  
日本ト佛印トノ共存共榮ヲ佛國ノ利益獨占ノ犧牲  
トスルモノデアアル。

此ノ如キ不合理、不公正ナル政策モ印度支那内部  
ニ對シテハ、保護權又ハ統治權ノ作用トシテ、マ

タ外國ニ對シテハ自主權ノ行動トシテ之ヲ正當化シ、安南人が苦痛ノ餘リ、屢々企圖シタル絶望的獨立運動ヲ暴徒ノ反亂トシ、他國人ニシテ之ヲ責ムレバ不當ノ干涉又ハ侵略的意圖ト看做シ、シカモ自ラノ過去及現在ノ暴力不正ノ侵略ト擲取行爲ヲ何等反省スル所ガナイノデアアル。

ハ 依ツテ我國ハ最早平和的手段ヲ以テシテハ印度支那民族ノ繁榮ト、東亞ニ於ケル諸民族ノ共存共榮ヲ實現スルコトハ不可能デアルト断定シテ、武力ヲ以ツテシテモ佛國勢力ヲ此ノ地ヨリ驅逐シテ我國ト此地ノ諸民族トノ眞ノ共存共榮ヲ計リ得ベキ新事態ヲ建設スル外途ナシ、ト謂ハネバナラス。之ガ爲ニハ適當ノ機會ヲ捉ヘテ決然立ツノ覺悟ヲ要スルノデアアル。コレガ我國ノ根本的對佛印政策デアルベキデアアル。

六 然ルニ現在ハ右政策實行ノ絶好ノ機會デアアル。即チ佛本國自身が危機ニ遭遇シテ殖民地ヲ顧ミル暇モ餘裕モナイ状態ニアルカラデアアル。シカモ其ノ上ニ佛國ハ現實ニ我が日支事變處理ニ對シテ援蔣陷トシテ佛印ヲ使用シテ糧食ニ我ニ敵性ヲ示シテキルノデアアル。尤モコノ援蔣行爲ヲ停止セシメルノミデアアルナラバ今日チハ容易ノ事ヲ斷乎タル態度ヲ以テ威嚇セバ彼ハ直チニ之ヲ停止シ、且ソノ



約東實行ノ爲例ヘバ我が監視員ヲ海防ソノ他必其  
ノ地駐ニ在セシムルガ如キコトモ容易ニ承諾ス  
ベシト認メラル。併シ我國ハ今日ニ於テハカクノ  
如キ眼前ノ問題ノミノ解決ヲ以テ満足スベキデハ  
ナク、實ハ援蔣行爲ハ我武力行使ノ理由トシテ之  
ヲ捉ラヘテヨツテ以テ究極ノ目的タル印度支那民  
族ヲ解放シテ東亞新秩序建設ノ一部分ヲ斷行スル  
コトヲ眼目トセネバナラス。

## 第二、緊急處置ノ表面上ノ理由トソノ究極ノ目的

- 一 我國ハ支那事變ノ解決ニ専念シテ居ル。而シテ佛  
印ハ有力ナル援蔣路ヲ明カニ我ニ警告ヲ示シテオ  
ル。依ツテ我ハ之ヲ停止セシメル爲止ムヲ得ズ武  
力行使ヲ成スコトヲ表面ノ理由トナス。
- 以上ノ様ナ理由ヲ高唱スルノハ、之ニヨツテ我國  
ガ此ノ機會ニ於テ我ニ害ヲ與ヘナイ他ノ英・佛・  
蘭ノ東洋ノ殖民地ヲモ順次攻撃セムトスルノ意志  
ヲ有シテオナイコトヲ一觀ニ推察セシムル爲デア  
ル。然シ右意圖ノナイコトハ聞ク者ノ推察ニ止メ、  
我ヨリ進ンデハ之ヲ聲明スルコトハナルベク避ケ  
ル。蓋シ更ニ後ニ至ツテ香港、在支租借地、租界、  
蘭印及マレー半島ニ工作ヲ行フ場合ニ言質トシテ  
利用セラレルコトヲ避クルタメデアル。
- 二 究極ノ目的ハコノ機會ニ於テ佛印ノ諸民族即チ安

南人（東蒲寨及老撾）ハ安南ノ屬國トスルカ否カハ  
更ニ後ニ考究）ヲ獨立セシメ、我國ノ計畫スベキ  
東亞協同體ニ加入セシムルコト。

以上ヲ目的トスルヲ以テ我國ノ武力行使モ亦、佛  
印ノ海防、河内等據蔭諸ニ直接關係ノ個所ノミナ  
ラス佛國勢力ヲ完全ニ驅逐スルニ必要ナル一切ノ  
個所ニ行フコト絶對ニ必要ナリ、マタ土着民族ノ  
獨立運動ニ對シテハ最初ノ程ハ表面上ハ彼等ガ獨  
自ノ意見ヲ以テ行フ自決ノ行爲トシテ、我ハ大ニ  
同情ヲ有スルモ干與スル所ニアラズトノ態度ヲ採  
ルコト、且ツ既ニ一應獨立ノ形態樹立ノ上ハ民族  
ノ意向ト東亞ノ共存共榮ニ合致スルモノトシテ大  
ニ支持シ、之ニ對スル干涉ハ何國ニモ容認シ得ザ  
ル態度ヲ持スルコトヲ要ス。

今次我が政府ガ獨伊ニ對シ、帝國ハ佛印ニ對シ非  
常ナル關心ヲ有スルニヨリ、コノ意向ヲ充分ニ斟  
酌シテ佛印ノ現狀ニ對シ非友好的ナル變更ヲ加ヘ  
ザル様切望スルコトヲ申出テタルガ如キコトハ自  
ラ進ンデ既ニ佛印ガ獨伊ノ手中ニアルコトヲ認メ  
テ、今後ノ佛印ノ處理ニ關シ終始彼ヲシテ介入セ  
シムルノ道ヲ開キ、東亞ノ新事態建設ニ獨伊ノ容  
察ヲ承認スルコト、ナリ、頗ル不利ノ結果ヲ生ヅ  
ルニ至ルベシ。尙本緊急處置ニ對シ左ノ如キ反對



論ヲ豫想スルコトガ出来ル。

(1) 他國ノ危急ニ際シテ火事場泥棒、又ハ空巢狙的  
行動ヲ行フハ道義ニ反シ國際的信用ヲ害シテ國  
家永遠ノ大策ニ反ストノ精神論モアルベシ。然  
シ佛國ハ、常ニ日本トハ管テ戦ヒタルコトナシ  
ト謂シテ、親善ヲ口ニシナガラ、我が國ガ危急  
多事ナルニ際シテハ常ニ例外ナク我ニ敵對スル  
行動ヲ敢テシタル世界無比ノ國デアルコトハ前  
述ノ通りデアルカラ、佛國自ラハカ、ル道義論  
ヲ云々スルノ資格ナシ、サラバトテ我ニ於テハ  
決シテ彼ノ暴ニ報ユルニ暴ヲ以テスル意志ハナ  
イノデアルガ、前述ノ如ク我ノ目的トスル所ハ  
國際正義ノ實現ニ外ナラザルノミナラズ、現ニ  
彼自ラガ我ニ敵對行爲ヲ繼續シツ、アルニ於テ  
ハ之ヲ防止スルノ策ヲトルニ何ノ恥ズル所アラ  
ムヤ、デアル。

或曰、以「德報怨」、何如、子曰何以報「德」、以「直報  
怨」、以「德報德」(論語)

(2) 我國ハ目下支那事變ノ處理ニ専念スベキデア  
ルニ、更ニ佛印ニ手ヲ延バズハ徒ラニ事變ヲ複雑  
化セシメ、二兎ヲ追フモノハ一兎ヲ得ザルノ結  
果トナル。トイフ説アラムモ、佛印ヨリ佛國勢  
力ヲ顯示スルハ有力ナル邊蔭路ヲ絶テテ支那事





變遷次ノ不可避ナルコトヲ高唱シテ彼ヲシテ眞ニ英・佛・蘭ノ諸殖民地攻撃ノ意思ナキコトヲ推察セシムル方途ヲ探ラベ今日直チニ武力干涉ヲ行フコトナカルベク、又他面我方ヘノ物資ノ輸出禁止ニ關シテハ我ヨリ先ンシテ若シ米國ニテカクノ如キヲ行ハゞ、我ハ又止ムヲ得ズ支那事變遂行及一般國防上緊要ノ物資確保ノ爲蘭印ヲモ手中ニ收ムルニ至ルベシトノ態度ヲ豫メ示シ置カベ東洋ニ嚴厲ノ擴大スルハ彼ノ禁輸行爲ガ因ヲ爲ハコトトナルヲ以テ之ヲモ敢行シ得ズルベシト認メラル。

- (4) 佛國ハ將來第二流國トナルベシ。從ツテ過去ノ行動ハ兎モ角、今後ハ佛印ニ關シテモ我國ノ該地方進出ニ對シテ大イニ讓歩的的態度ニ出ヅ可キヲ以テ今日特ニ武力行便等ノ行動ニ出ヅル必要ナク將來ハ萬事平和的ニ有利ニ解決シ得ベシトノ意見モアルベシ。

コノ意見ハ從來ノ現狀維持論者ノ腦裡ニ深ク滲透シ居ルモノナルモ期待外レニスギズ。第一コノマ、ニセバ、佛國ガ將來モ引續キ印度支那ヲ保有シ得ルヤ否ヤハ疑問ナルモ、假リニ之ヲ爲シ得トスルモ今次戦争ノ結果多クノ領土及殖民地ヲ失フベキ佛國ハ、將來佛印ニ依存スル程度

ハ過去ニ比シテ一層大トナルベク、從ツテ彼  
 之ヲ防禦スルコト益々嚴トナルベシ。シカモ佛  
 國ヨリ考フレバ佛印ヲ脅成スルハ日本ナリ、依  
 ツテ益々我ニ對シテ警戒ヲ嚴ニスベク、シカモ  
 彼一國ニテハ防禦シ得ザルヲ以テ必ズヤ米・英  
 (特ニ米)ヲ引キ入レテ、我ニ當ラシムル策ヲ  
 トルベシ。從ツテ今日迄ハ自己ノ國際的威カト  
 外交的處置トニヨリ自力ニヨリ佛印ヲ防禦シ得  
 ト考ヘ居タルヲ以テ英・米等ニ對シテモ程度ノ  
 差コソアレ、鎖國的政策ヲ採リ來リタルモ今後  
 ハ積極的ニ米國等ノ投資ヲ歡迎シ、更ニ進ンデ  
 之ニ利權ヲ供シテ利害關係ヲ密ニシ、マタ米・  
 英等ノ援助ニヨツテ國防ヲ強化シ、例ヘバ「カ  
 ムラン」灣等ニ軍港ノ設備ヲ完備シテ之ヲ前記  
 諸國ノ共同使用ニ供シテ第二ノ「シンガポール」  
 タラシムルニ至ルベキハ火ヲ見ルヨリモ明カナ  
 リ。

カクテハ米・英ヲシテ佛印迄進出セシムルコト  
 ハナリ、我國ト佛印自強トノ關係ニツイテハ勿  
 論、支那トノ關係ヨリミルモ我國ハ過去ニ比シ  
 テ一層不利ナル狀態ニ置カル、ニ至ルベシ。  
 更ニ我國ハ今固獨、伊ニ對シテ佛印ニ非友好的  
 變更ヲ加ヘザルコトヲ要求シ、恰モ自ラ佛國ノ



爲ノ番犬タルノ役ヲナシタル觀アリ。獨、伊モ  
 戰爭中ノ今日ニ於テハ一應コレヲ承諾スベキモ  
 若シ勝利ヲ以テ戰局ヲ結ビタル上ハ如何ナル態  
 度ニ出ヅ可キヤハ計ルベカラズ、特ニ所屬ヲ變  
 更スルニ至ラズトスルモ少クトモ利權ソノ他ノ  
 待遇ニ關シ、自己ニ有利ナル狀態ヲ發生セシメ、  
 戰勝ノ餘威ヲ以テ大イニコレ等地方ニ進出シ來  
 ルベク、カクテハ更ニ我ニ對スル競爭者ノ増加  
 トナリ、東亞協同體ノ建設ハ益々困難トナル。  
 結局佛國將來ノ衰退ハ佛印ニ對スル我ノ威力ヲ  
 増スニ效アリトスルモ諸大國モ亦同様威力ヲ加  
 ヘ得ルヲ以テ、我一國ノミガ有利ニ進出シ得ト  
 豫期スルガ如キハ全く一個ノ夢想トナリ終ルコ  
 トヲ豫期セネバナラス。

更ニ獨、伊ガ一應今回ノ我國ノ申出ヲ承諾スル  
 トスルモ佛印ノ諸民族特ニ安南人ハ日本ノ不徹  
 底ノ態度頗ムニ足ラズトシテ恐ラク獨逸ニ對シ  
 テ獨立援助ヲ請フニ至ルベシ。若シ將來獨逸ガ  
 之ニ應ジテ東亞被壓迫民族ノ解放ヲ名トシテ講  
 和條約等ニ於テ佛印民族ノ獨立ヲ行ハムトセバ、  
 我ハ如何ナル態度ヲトルカ。彼等ハ獨立ノ期ニ

2379-13

違へズトカ、ソノ他ノ理由ヲ以テ之ニ反對セバ  
東亞民族ニ對スル日本ノ精神的威力ト信望ハ全  
ク地ニ墜ツルニ至ルベク、若シ之ニ贊成セバ（  
贊成ト同時ニ經濟關係等有利ノ條件ヲ附シオク  
トスルモ）最早ヤ該地方ニ對スル獨逸ノ威力ハ  
獨立ノ父トシテ斷然我ニ勝ルベクカクテ該地方  
ハ事實上、獨逸ノ支配下ニ立ツニ至ルベシ。



以上前記處置ニ對シ豫想セラレル反對說ニ問ヘタ  
ノデアルガ、更ニ右處置ヲ斷行スベキコトハ左記事  
態ヲ考慮スル場合益々其ノ緊要ナルヲ認メルノデア  
ル。

即チ、我國ハワシントン會議ニ於テヴェルサイユ  
平和條約ニヨリ我ニ認メタ權益アル等ヲ米英ノ共  
同強制ノ下ニ吐キ出サネバナラヌ窮狀ニ陥ツタガ此  
等ノ前例ヲ考ヘルト今日直備全段ニ亘ツテ其目的ノ  
大擴張ヲ行ツテキル米國ガコノ擴張完成後今日彼ガ  
妨害シツ、アル我が對支行動ニヨツテ發生シタ事態  
ヲ覆スガ如キ要求ヲ彼一國又ハ歐洲諸國ト聯合シテ  
我ニ行ヒ來ラズト誰ガ斷言シ得ルカ。ソノ際既ニ彼  
ノ石油、鐵屑ノ輸出禁止ノミニテモ戰爭行為ノ繼續  
不能ニ陥ルコトヲ虞レ居ル人々ハ如何ナル態度ヲ採  
ラムトスルカ。若シ他ヨリコレ等物資ヲ求メテ米ニ  
對抗セムトスルナラバ必ズ先ズソノ場所ヲ確保シ置  
ク必要カアルハシカモコレヲ歐米ノ地ニ求ムルコト  
ハ出來ナイ。是非トモ近接ノ東洋、南洋ニ求メネバ  
ナラヌ。シカルニ徒ラニ是等ノ地方ノ歐洲諸國支配  
權承認ノ現狀維持ノミヲ目的トシテ行動シテ居ツテ  
ハ、右ノ如キ重大危機ニ於テハ是等ノ支配國ハ今日  
我國ノ好意ニモ抱ラズ必ズ物資ヲ我ニ供給セザルノ

2379-15-

ミカ、積極的ニ我ニ向ツテ敵對行爲ニ出ヅルデアラ  
ウ。

果シテ然ラバ今日我國が専念スルトイフ支那事變ニ  
ヨル成果モ結局十年後ニハ又吐キ出サネバナラヌ結  
果トナルデハナイカ。故ニ今日我國ハ、歐米ガ歐洲  
戦争ニ心身ヲ忙殺サレテキル際ニ、他日軍備ヲ完成  
シタ米國ノコノ行動ニ充分對抗シテ我地歩ヲ確乎ト  
シテ防衛シ得ルノ實力ヲ準備シテおく必要ガアル。  
ソレニハ東亞諸地方ノ解放ヲ進行シテ、常ニ我ト提  
携スベキ事態ヲ樹立シテソノ資源ト軍略的地位トラ  
我ハ、我が味方タルベキモノノ手中ニ入レテ置ネ  
バナラヌノデアアル。

### 第三、緊急處置ノ實行方法

一 我國ハ前記ノ第二ノ一ノ理由ヲ聲明シテ臨時ニ海  
防、トウラン（Hougang）西貢（米ヲ徒ラニ刺戟  
スル處アラバ最初ハ此ハ除ク）等ノ要港ヲ封鎖シ  
同時ニ廣東、廣西ノ陸上ヨリ又適當ノ海岸ヨリ軍  
ヲ進撃セシメテ先ヅ海防、及ビ河内ヲ占領シ、其  
他所要ノ地點ニ軍事行動ヲ行フ。

ニ 豫メ我國、支那及泰ニ亡命セル安南獨立ヲ計畫セ  
ル志士ヲ急遽招集シ置キテ我が軍ト共ニ彼地ニ乘  
込マシメテ安南獨立假政府ノ如キヲ組織セシメ、



2379-16

安南人ニ對シ佛勢力ヲ驅逐シ獨立ノ完成ニ協力スベキコトヲ大々的ニ宣傳セシメル。

三 暴急ナルヲ以テ事實上彼等ニ於テ新政府ノ機能ヲ充分發揮シ得ザルベキハ斷ナシト雖モ安南ノ國家組織ハ強固ニシテ發達セル社（町村）ノ自治ニ甚本ヲ有シ、從ツテ一時、中央、及地方官署ノ機能停止スルトスルモシカク混亂ニ陷ルモノニアラズ、況ヤ地方ノ官憲ハ中央獨立政府ノ何分ノ命令アル迄ハ佛勢力ノ驅逐以外ハ悉ク從來ノ通り其ノ職務ヲ行フベキコトヲ命ゼバシカク混亂スベシトハ考ヘラレズ、尤モ當分ノ間ハ我が國ニ於テ重政ヲ施行シテ治安維持ニ當ル等適當ノ施政ヲ行フ要アルハ勿論デアル。

四 我が直ガ佛印ニ進軍ノ際、其ノ目的ガ他國ノ援將行爲防止ニアリテ佛印ノ國土ノ攻略ニアラザルコトヲ宣傳スベキハ申迄モナイガ、時ニ安南獨立假政府ガ行フベキ安南人ニ對スル獨立運動參加要求ノ宣傳方法トシテハ、右政府所屬ノ安南人ノ宣傳部隊ヲ佛軍支配區域ヘ潛入セシメテ宣傳セシムル外、更ニラジオ、飛行機ニヨル宣傳文ノ配布、其他ノ方法ヲ以テ安南人軍隊、鐵道、汽車、汽船、電信、電話等ノ交通、通信機關ノ従業員、各工場、農園ノ労働者ノ如キ團體、及官廳、學校、組合、

新聞社等ノ職員ノ如キヲ目標トシテ獨立行動ニ對  
 スル協力ヲ求メ、各人ヲシテ其ノ地位ト事情トニ  
 應ジテ或ハ前記諸設備ノ占據、破壞、運搬ノ妨害  
 等ヲ行ハシメテ先ヅ佛軍及官憲ノ機能ノ減殺ニ努  
 メ、シカル後順次一總安南人ニ對スル宣傳ニ及ボ  
 ス。我ガ國ハ直接ノ目的トスル所ハ援蔭降遮斷ニ  
 アルコトヲ標榜スルヲ以テ最初ノ程ハ獨立運動ニ  
 ハ關係ナキ態度ヲ持スベキモ漸次ニ安南人ガ年來  
 ノ宿望タル獨立ヲ立成スルコトハ東亞ノ共存共榮  
 ニ資スルコト大ナリトシテ大ニ支持スルコト。佛  
 印ニハ若干ノ佛兵、外國人傭兵アリ、飛行機、戰  
 車、軍艦等モアルベシト雖モ齒ズルニ足ラズ、安  
 南人軍隊及一般人之大部分ハ直ニ獨立運動ニ參加  
 スルカ、少クトモ中立ノ態度ヲ採ルベク、中ニハ  
 佛國ノ強制ニヨツテ最初ハ我ニ抵抗スル者アラム  
 モ、既ニ佛本國ガ獨重ニ降服セル今日佛軍隊ニ敵  
 意アルベシト思ハレズ、若干形式的反抗ノ上順次  
 各地方トモ本國ノ例ニ倣ツテ無防備地帯ヲ宣言ス  
 ルニ至ルベシ。カクシテ印度支那民族ノ解放ノ實  
 現ハ容易ニ行ヒ得ルモノト認メラル。

尤モサラバト云ツテ儼ツテ可ナリトイフノデハナ  
 ク、ナホ兎ヲ打ツ獅子ニ學ンデ渾身ノ力ヲ以テ向  
 フベキハ勿論デアル。



2379-18

以上ノ如クニシテ安南人ヲ解放實現ニ努ムル一方、  
之ヲ指導援助シテ新秩序ノ建設ニ取リカ、ラネバ  
ナラス。其レガタメニハ軍事行動以外、政治、經  
済、文化其他各般事項ニ亘ツテ我ガ國ノ充分ノ努  
力ヲ準備ヲ要スルガ、此ハ第二次ノ事ニ屬シ先ツ  
右第一次ノ處置ヲ行フ決心ヲ朝野ニ於テ爲スコト  
ヲ緊急問題ト認ムカラ第二次ノ問題ニ關シテハ今  
コ、ニ述ベズ。

(昭和十五年六月十九日)